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Abstract
Multicarrier phase-based ranging is fast emerging as a
cost-optimized solution for a wide variety of proximity-
based applications due to its low power requirement,
low hardware complexity and compatibility with existing
standards such as ZigBee and 6LoWPAN. Given poten-
tially critical nature of the applications in which phase-
based ranging can be deployed (e.g., access control, asset
tracking), it is important to evaluate its security guaran-
tees. Therefore, in this work, we investigate the security
of multicarrier phase-based ranging systems and specifi-
cally focus on distance decreasing relay attacks that have
proven detrimental to the security of proximity-based ac-
cess control systems (e.g., vehicular passive keyless en-
try and start systems). We show that phase-based rang-
ing, as well as its implementations, are vulnerable to a
variety of distance reduction attacks. We describe differ-
ent attack realizations and verify their feasibility by sim-
ulations and experiments on a commercial ranging sys-
tem. Specifically, we successfully reduced the estimated
range to less than 3m even though the devices were more
than 50 m apart. We discuss possible countermeasures
against such attacks and illustrate their limitations, there-
fore demonstrating that phase-based ranging cannot be
fully secured against distance decreasing attacks.
1 Introduction
The use of proximity and location information is ubiq-
uitous today in a wide range of applications [20, 38].
For example, proximity-based access tokens (e.g., con-
tactless smart cards, key fobs) are prevalent today in a
number of systems [17, 34] including public transport
ticketing, parking and highway toll fee collection, pay-
ment systems, electronic passports, physical access con-
trol and personnel tracking. Furthermore, modern auto-
mobiles use passive keyless entry systems (PKES) to un-
lock, lock or start the vehicle. The vehicle automatically
identifies and unlocks when the key fob is in proximity,
and there is no need for the user to remove the key from
his pocket. By eliminating the need for user interaction,
PKES-like systems also offer better protection in scenar-
ios, e.g., where the user forgets to lock the car manually.
With the advent of modern cyber physical autonomous
systems and the internet of things, the need for proxim-
ity and location information is only bound to increase.
Numerous ranging techniques [23] that use radio com-
munication signals have been developed in the recent
years. Some techniques are based on estimating the
change in the physical characteristics of the signal such
as amplitude, phase and frequency. For example, ranging
systems based on received signal strength (RSS) [7, 43]
rely on the free-space path-loss propagation model to es-
timate the distance between two entities. Other ranging
techniques estimate distance based on the time-of-flight
(e.g., roundtrip time of flight (RTOF), time-difference-
of-arrival (TDOA)) [41,45] of the radio frequency signal.
Most of these ranging techniques are inherently in-
secure. For example, an attacker can fake the signal
strength in an RSS-based ranging system. Similarly, in
an ultrasonic ranging system, an attacker can gain an
advantage by relaying messages over the faster radio-
frequency channel [39]. Recently, it was shown that the
PKES systems used in automobiles are also vulnerable
to relay attacks [15]. In a relay attack, the attacker uses
two proxy devices to relay the communications between
two legitimate entities without requiring any knowledge
of the actual data being transmitted; therefore indepen-
dent of any cryptographic primitives implemented. Re-
searchers were able to unlock the car and drive away even
though the legitimate key was several hundred meters
away from the car. Similar relay attacks were demon-
strated on other radio-frequency based access tokens
(NFC phones [16], Google Wallet [35]), even though the
communication range for many such contactless systems
is limited to a few centimeters.
Multicarrier phase-based ranging [8] is fast emerg-
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ing as a cost-optimized solution for a wide variety of
proximity-based applications. The low hardware com-
plexity and their low power consumption make them
suitable for power-constrained wireless sensor system
applications. For example, the advent of internet of
things has seen an increasing number of smart and
networked devices being deployed ubiquitously where
low power consumption is a key requirement. To-
day, multicarrier phase-based ranging solutions [1, 6, 42]
that are compliant with prominent standards such as
WiFi, ZigBee [5] and 6LoWPAN [21] are already be-
ing commercialized (e.g., warehouse monitoring, child-
monitoring). Given the widespread deployment of
802.11 WiFi networks, several indoor localization and
ranging schemes [4, 12, 42, 44] that use the carrier-phase
of the radio signals have been proposed. For exam-
ple, Chronos [42] leverages the carrier phase information
of the 802.11 WiFi signals to implement a centimetre-
level localization and ranging system using commodity
WiFi cards. The implications of distance modification
attacks in scenarios where these systems are deployed in
security-critical applications like access control to auto-
mobiles, critical infrastructure, and medical devices are
significant and have not been investigated so far.
Therefore, in this work, we investigate the security
of carrier phase-based ranging systems and demonstrate
their vulnerability to distance modification attacks by ex-
ploiting the inherent physical properties of the signal. We
focus on attacks which result in a decrease of the mea-
sured distance since these have been shown to be most
relevant in a majority of security applications. Specifi-
cally, we make the following contributions:
• We show that phase-based ranging, as well as its
implementations, are vulnerable to a variety of dis-
tance reduction attacks. To this extent, we describe
three different attack realizations with varying de-
gree of attacker complexity and evaluate their ef-
fectiveness under various conditions.
• We demonstrate the attack on a commercial multi-
carrier phase-ranging system and show that it is fea-
sible to reduce the estimated distance significantly.
Specifically, through our experiments we success-
fully reduced the estimated range to less than 3 m
even though the devices were more than 50m apart.
• We discuss possible countermeasures against these
distance decreasing relay attacks and illustrate their
limitations. We show how implementing counter-
measures such as e.g., estimating rough time-of-
flight, pseudorandom frequency hopping etc. only
increases the system complexity without fully se-
curing against distance decreasing attacks.
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Figure 1: Phase Ranging: The prover locks its local os-
cillator to the verfier’s signal and transmits it back to the
verifier. The verifier then measures the distance based on
the difference in the phase of the received signal and its
reference signal.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we give a brief overview of phase-based
distance measurement technique. We describe our dis-
tance decreasing relay attacks in Section 3 and present
our experimental results in Section 4. In Section 5, we
discuss possible countermeasures and their effectiveness
in preventing the distance decreasing relay attacks. We
present related work in Section 6 and finally conclude in
Section 7.
2 Background
2.1 Phase-based Ranging
In phase-based ranging, two devices A and B measure
the distance between them by estimating the phase dif-
ference between a received continuous wave signal and
a local reference signal. For example, if device A (veri-
fier) is measuring its distance to device B (prover), then
the verifier begins ranging by transmitting a continuous
wave carrier signal. The prover locks its local oscilla-
tor to this incoming signal and transmits it back to the
verifier. The verifier measures the distance based on the
difference in the phase of the received signal and its ref-
erence signal as shown in Figure 1. If the distance d
between the verifier and the prover is less than the sig-
nal’s wavelength i.e.,
2 · f
c
, where f is the frequency of
the signal and c is the speed of light, the measured phase
difference θ will be,
θ = 4pi · d · f
c
(1)
In order to unambiguously measure distances greater
than the signal’s wavelength, it is necessary to keep track
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Figure 2: Multicarrier Phase Ranging: Two signals of
different frequencies that travel the same amount of time
will experience a different phase shift.
of the number of whole cycles elapsed. Therefore, the
equation for measuring d becomes,
d =
c
2 · f · (
θ
2pi
+n) (2)
where n is an integer which reflects the number of
whole cycles elapsed. The need for keeping track of n is
eliminated by using continuous wave signals of different
frequencies.
2.2 Multicarrier Phase Ranging
Multicarrier phase ranging systems eliminates the whole
cycle ambiguity by transmitting continuous wave signals
at different frequencies (Figure 2). For example, the ver-
ifier first transmits a signal with a frequency f1 to which
the prover locks its local oscillator and retransmits the
signal back to the verifier. At the verifier, the measured
phase difference between the received signal from the
prover and the verifier’s own signal for this frequency
(θ1) is given by (from Equation 2),
θ1 = 2pi · (2 ·d · f1c +n) (3)
The verifier then transmits a continuous wave signal
with a frequency f2 and measures the phase difference
(θ2) as previously.
θ2 = 2pi · (2 ·d · f2c +n) (4)
The distance d between the verifier and the prover can
be unambiguously measured by combining equations 3
and 4:
d =
c
4pi
· θ2−θ1
f2− f1 (5)
Phase Slope Method: In real-world, using only two fre-
quencies to measure the phase differences results in poor
ranging accuracy. Therefore, it is typical for the verifier
to measure the phase differences on more than two fre-
quencies, thereby improving the system’s resolution and
accuracy. The phase difference measurements (θi) for
each frequency ( fi) can be expressed in the form of:
θi =
4pi
c
· fi ·d+N (6)
If the phase differences are plotted on a phase vs fre-
quency curve, the slope of the curve represents the dis-
tance d between the verifier and the prover (Figure 3). In
other words, the above equation can be seen as a straight
line with the distance proportional to the slope of the line:
d =
c
4pi
· slope (7)
Figure 3a shows the measured phase differences
vs frequency for two different distances. The phase-
differences are straightened as is shown in Figure 3b to
calculate the effective slope and estimate the distance
between the verifier and the prover.
2.3 Commercial Phase Ranging Systems
Due to their low-complexity and low power requirement,
multicarrier phase ranging is fast emerging as a cost-
optimized solution for a wide variety of applications.
For example, multicarrier phase ranging has been pro-
posed for the positioning of ultra-high frequency RFID
systems [24, 25]. More recently, Atmel released a ra-
dio transceiver [6] specifically targeting low-power ap-
plications and complying with standards such as Zig-
Bee [5] and 6LoWPAN [21]. The radio transceiver
AT86RF233 is designed for use in industry, scientific
and medical (ISM) band applications and implements
multicarrier phase-based ranging technique for distance
measurement. Further more, leveraging the proliferation
of 802.11 WiFi networks and the availability of carrier
phase information directly from the network cards [18],
several indoor localization schemes [4, 12] have been
proposed recently. For example, Chronos [42] leverages
the carrier phase information of the 802.11 WiFi signals
to implement an indoor localization and ranging system
using commodity WiFi cards with centimeter-level pre-
cision.
The ranging procedure in these systems is typically
divided into control and ranging signals. The control
messages are all transmitted using the same preset
frequency and is used to set up the necessary parameters
and time synchronization for the ranging to take place.
In addition, the verifier and prover exchange the results
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(a) The phase of the received signal.
~d2
~d1
(b) The straightened phase of the received signal.
Figure 3: Phase versus frequency if the prover is 10 and 20 m away from the verifier.
of the ranging using the control channel. The frequen-
cies of the continuous wave signals used in the ranging
ranges from 2.324− 2.527GHz with configurable hop
sizes of 0.5, 1, 2, 4 MHz.
3 Security of Phase Ranging Systems
In this section, we investigate the security of phase
ranging systems with a focus on the physical-layer
distance decreasing attacks as these attacks have been
shown to be detrimental to a number of security critical
applications (e.g., NFC payment systems [16, 35],
keyless entry systems in automobiles [15]).
3.1 Distance Decreasing Relay Attacks
We consider two devices, a verifier and a prover that are
able to communicate over a wireless radio link. The
devices implement multicarrier phase measurement for
ranging. The verifier measures and verifies the distance
claimed by the prover. The verifier is trusted and is as-
sumed to be honest. In this setting, distance decreasing
attacks can be mounted in two ways: (i) by a dishon-
est prover trying to cheat on its distance to the verifier,
referred to as an internal attack and (ii) by an external
attacker who aims to shorten the distance between the
verifier and the honest prover, referred to as a “distance-
decreasing relay attack”.
There are several ways for a dishonest or a malicious
prover to mount an internal attack. For example, a ma-
licious prover can cheat on the distance by not locking
on to the correct phase when the verifier transmits its in-
terrogating signal (from Figure 1). The malicious prover
can simply respond with a signal that is phase incoher-
ent with the verifier’s reference signal; thus resulting in
a different distance estimate at the verifier. Such internal
attacks can only be prevented by distance bounding [9]
and implementing distance bounding [29, 31, 33] require
a number of hardware-software modifications that are in-
compatible with the existing design of phase ranging sys-
tems. In this work, we focus on external attackers under
the assumption that both the verifier and the prover are
trusted and honest. Such a scenario is most applicable to
e.g., passive keyless entry systems where the key fob and
the car are both trusted and assumed to be honest. How-
ever, we note that the presented attacks in this paper can
be used by a dishonest prover to decrease its distance to
the verifier without any loss of generality.
Additionally, it is important that the verifier and the
prover exchange data that is cryptographically generated.
Otherwise, it would be trivial for an unauthorized device
to recreate the ranging signals and appear legitimate
to the verifier. Throughout this paper, we assume
that the verifier and the prover generate and exchange
cryptographic data in order to prevent unauthorized
ranging attempts.
3.2 Phase-slope Rollover Attack
Recall that in a multicarrier phase ranging system, dis-
tance d is measured based on the estimated phase dif-
ferences between two or more carrier frequency signals
(Equation 5). Thus, the maximum measurable distance
i.e., the largest value of distance dmax that can be esti-
mated using multicarrier phase-ranging system, depends
on the maximum measurable phase difference ∆θmax be-
tween the two frequency signals. Given that the phase
values range from 0 to 2pi , the maximum measurable
phase difference between any two frequencies is ∆θmax =
2pi . Substituting the values in Equation 5 the maximum
measurable distance is given by,
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Figure 4: The verifier’s signal travels unaltered from the
verifier to the prover. There the prover locks onto the in-
coming signal and transmits a signal with the same phase
back. The attacker intercepts the prover’s signal and de-
lays each frequency by the same amount. The verifier
calculates an incorrect distance measurement based on
the attacker’s signal.
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Figure 5: The verifier and prover are located 30 m from
each other and the frequency hop size is 2 MHz (roll over
happens at every 500 ns / 75 m). The figure shows the
measured distance at the verifier when an attacker uni-
formly delays all the frequencies by the same amount.
dmax =
c
4pi
· ∆θmax
∆ f
dmax =
c
2
· 1
∆ f
(8)
For example, if the frequency hop size is 2MHz (∆ f ), the
maximum distance measurable without any ambiguity is
75 m after which the measured distance rolls over to 0 m.
Similarly for frequency hop sizes of 0.5, 1, 2, 4 MHz,
the maximum measurable distances are 300, 150, 75 and
37.5 m respectively, beyond which there is a rollover.
In our phase-slope rollover attack, we demonstrate
how an attacker can leverage the maximum measurable
distance property of the phase ranging system in order to
execute the distance decreasing relay attack.
The phase-slope rollover attack is illustrated in
V P
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Figure 6: The verifier’s signal travels unaltered from the
verifier to the prover. There the prover locks onto the
incoming signal and transmits a signal with the same
phase back. The attacker intercepts the prover’s signal
and delays each frequency individually.The verifier cal-
culates an incorrect distance measurement based on the
attacker’s signal.
Figure 4. The attacker is assumed to be closer to the
verifier than the prover. For illustrative simplicity, here
we assume that the prover is far away from the verifier
or in other words, the verifier and the prover are not in
communication range. During a phase-slope rollover
attack, the attacker simply relays (amplify and forward)
the verifier’s interrogating signal to the prover. The
prover determines the phase of the interrogating signal
and re-transmits a response signal that is phase-locked
with the verifier’s interrogating signal. The attacker
receives the prover’s response signal and forwards it
to the verifier, however with a time delay (∆t). The
attacker chooses the time delay such that measured
phase differences ∆θ between the carrier frequency
signals reaches its maximum value of 2pi and rolls over.
Considering the previous example of a system with
the frequency hop size of 2MHz, the measured phase
differences ∆θ rolls over every 500ns. Figure 5 shows
how the measured distance by the verifier changes
depending on the delay ∆t introduced by the attacker.
In Section 4, we demonstrate the feasibility of such an
attack on a commercial phase-based ranging system
using a experimental setup. Furthermore, we show that
an attacker can decrease the estimated distance to the
minimum possible distance measurable (depends on
sampling rate) by the system irrespective of the true
distance of the prover.
3.3 RF Cycle Slip Attack
In this section, we describe an alternative way for an at-
tacker to decrease the estimated distance of multicarrier
phase ranging systems. In this attack, the attacker ma-
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Figure 7: The delay of each frequency the attacker needs
to introduce to decrease the distance to 1 m from 30 and
74 m respectively. Here dvp is prover-verifier distance.
nipulates the phase of individual carrier frequencies in
order to achieve the required phase difference between
the carrier frequencies that will result in a reduced dis-
tance estimate at the verifier. This is in contrast to the
phase-slope rollover attack described previously, where
the attacker simply delays all the carrier frequencies by
∆t until the effective phase difference between the carrier
frequencies exceed the maximum value and rolls over.
In a RF cycle slip attack, the attacker delays each
carrier frequency fi by ∆ti. Recall that at the verifier,
phase difference θi is measured between the prover’s
response signal and the verifier’s reference signal for
frequency fi. Thus, an attacker can alter θi by delaying
individual carrier signals by an amount that causes each
phase measurement to change to a value θ ′i . The attacker
chooses the new phase, θ ′i , for each frequency such that
the slope of the phase vs frequency graph decreases
and thus decreasing the measured distance. Figure 7
illustrates the delays needed for individual carrier
frequencies to cause a particular distance estimate by the
verifier. One of the drawbacks of this method is that the
attacker needs very high sampling rate. Alternatively,
the attacker can use analog delay lines [26, 40] to realize
such a relay attack hardware.
3.4 On-the-fly Phase Manipulation Attack
In this section, we present a real-time phase manipula-
tion attack, in which the attacker is not required to delay
the prover’s response signal. In this attack, the attacker
manipulates the phase of the prover’s response signal by
mixing it with specially crafted signal which results in an
appropriate phase difference at the verifier. It is impor-
tant to note that the real-time phase manipulation attacks
keeps any possible data exchanged intact independent of
the modulation scheme used.
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Figure 8: Attacker phase shifts the prover’s signal by first
mixing it with a signal of twice the frequency and then
low-pass filters the result before transmitting it to the ver-
ifier.
Figure 8 illustrates the real-time phase manipulation
attack. The prover receives the interrogating signal and
re-transmits a phase-locked response signal back to the
verifier. The prover’s response sP(t) can be expressed as
sP(t) = cos(2pi f t+θap) (9)
where f is the signal frequency and θap is the received
phase of the prover’s signal at the attacker. The attacker
receives the prover’s signal sP(t) and mixes it with a spe-
cially crafted signal si f (t) = cos(4pi f t + θA) before re-
laying the signal to the verifier. Note that the crafted
signal has twice the frequency of the prover’s response
signal. This is to account for the frequency conversion
that occurs during mixing of two signals. The attacker’s
signal sA(t) (after filtering high frequency components)
that is finally relayed to the verifier can be derived as fol-
lows:
sA(t) = si f (t)⊗ sP(t)
= cos(2pi f t+θap)⊗ cos(4pi f t+θA)
LP
=
1
2
cos
(
2pi f t+θA−θap
) (10)
From Equation 10, we observe that the relayed signal
sA(t) is identical to the prover’s response signal except
that it is shifted in phase. Recall that (Equation 5),
in a multicarrier phase ranging system, the measured
distance depends on the change in phase difference
measurements between each carrier frequency. Thus,
in order to modify the measured distance, the attacker
needs to manipulate the phase of each carrier frequency
such that it results in a reduced distance estimate. In
other words, the attacker has to choose θA such that
θA−θap results in a phase difference estimate that corre-
sponds to the reduced distance. In order to configure θA,
the attacker must have apriori knowledge of the phase
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of the prover’s signal when received at the attacker’s
location (θap). The attacker can detect the phase of the
verifier’s signal when it received it and if the attacker
knows the distance between the attacker and the prover,
the attacker can estimate θap. An alternative method for
the attacker would be to actually detect (e.g., using a
phase-locked loop) the phase of the prover’s response
signal. However, this would introduce unnecessary
delays1 in the relaying hardware thus making it less
favourable for the attacker.
4 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the feasibility of the above
described distance decreasing relay attacks using both
commercial phase-ranging systems and simulations.
First, we demonstrate the distance decrease relay attack
on the commercially available Atmel AT86RF233 radio
transceiver [6, 32] that implements multicarrier phase-
based ranging technique. Furthermore, we evaluate
the feasibility of the attacks in different environmental
conditions (e.g., noise, communication range) using
simulations.
Table 1: Atmel hardware configuration for the attack
Parameter Value
Frequency Hop ∆ f 2MHz
Ranging Frequency Range 2.403−2.443GHz
Control Message Frequency 2.4GHz
No. of Frequencies 20
Signal Strength −17dBm
4.1 Practical Demonstration of the Attack
Figure 9 shows the experimental setup used in evaluating
the feasibility of executing the distance decreasing relay
attack on the Atmel phase-ranging system. Our setup
consists of two multicarrier phase ranging devices based
on Atmel AT86RF233 radio transceiver. One device (1)
acts as the prover while the other device (3) takes the
role of the verifier. The verifier continuously measures
the distance between the prover and itself and outputs the
result to the connected laptop (4). The laptop was con-
figured to continuously log the distance measurements.
We used Atmel’s default setup for configuring the rang-
ing parameters2 and list them in Table 1.
1due to the settling time of PLLs
2For the 50 m attack the transmit power of the Atmel devices was
increased to −10dBm
dap
3
4
2
1
Figure 9: Our experimental setup consists of two mul-
ticarrier phase ranging devices based on the Atmel
AT86RF233 radio transceiver, that function as the prover
(1) and verifier (3). The distance measured by the verifier
is recorded to the connected laptop (4). The attacker’s
hardware (2) consists of an USRP [2] and two directional
antennas, one each for receiving the prover’s response
signal and the other for transmitting the attacker’s signal
to the verifier.
~50m
Figure 10: Hallway in which the experiment took place.
4.1.1 Attacker Hardware
The attacker’s hardware (2) consists of an USRP [2]
and two directional antennas, one used for receiving
the prover’s response signal and the other for transmit-
ting the attacker’s signal to the verifier. The attacker
setup was placed close to the verifier while the prover
was placed at different distances to the verifier. We
implemented the phase-slope rollover attack described
in Section 3.2 in which the attacker delays all the
carrier frequencies until the effective phase difference
between the frequencies exceed the maximum value of
2pi and rolls over. The verifier’s interrogating signal was
left unmodified and the attacker manipulated (delayed
and amplified) only the prover’s response signal. In
order to minimize the processing delay due to the
attacker’s hardware, all processing was done directly
on the USRP’s FPGA, that included receiving, delaying
and transmitting the signal. In other words, the host
7
Figure 11: Effectiveness of the distance decreasing relay
attack where the prover and verifier are located 30, 40
and 50 m apart and the attacker attempts to decrease the
distance.
computer of the USRP was bypassed completely and the
signal processing was done solely in the FPGA of the
USRP. The delay from receiving to transmitting, caused
by the USRP hardware, was 536.22ns with a standard
deviation of 1.83ns. The USRP’s host computer was
only used to trigger the relay attack and for specifying
the amount of delay to introduce into the prover’s
response signal. The delay was made configurable from
the host and tuned at runtime to achieve the desired
attack objective.
4.1.2 Experimental Results
We placed the prover at distances 30m, 40m and 50m
away from the verifier in an empty hallway. The prover
and verifier were in communication range during the
experiment and thus were able to estimate their true
distance in the absence of the attacker. The results of our
experiment are shown in Figure 11. As can be observed,
without the presence of the attacker (solid line), the
verifier and the prover estimate their true distance. When
the attack is triggered, the verifier’s estimated distance
begins to reduce. The gradual reduction is due to the
verifier averaging the range estimates over a number of
samples. We note that the experiment was carried out
in a corridor (see Figure 10)with significant interference
from other ISM band systems (e.g., WiFi). Even in such
conditions, our attacker was able to reduce the distance
estimate by more than 50m.
4.1.3 Rollover Using Only Amplification
If two phase-ranging devices are further away from each
other than the maximum unambiguous distance that they
can measure an attacker can cause a roll-over by simply
θ
AWGN
dva dap
V P
AWGN
Δt
Figure 12: Simulation of the Phase-slope rollover and RF
cycle slip attack where dva and dap is the verifier-attacker
distance and attacker-prover distance respectively. Addi-
tive White Gaussian noise is added to the verifier’s and
prover’s signal. The attacker delays the prover’s signal.
For the Phase-slope rollover attack all frequencies are de-
layed equally but for the RF cycle slip attack each carrier
frequency is uniquely delayed.
amplifying their signals. We simulated such and attack
on the Atmel AT86RF233 radio transceivers. We placed
the devices at roughly 53m apart. When the devices were
configured to use a frequency hop size of 2MHz they
correctly estimated their position. However, when con-
figured to use a hop size of 4MHz they incorrectly mea-
sured a distance of 15− 16m, which is consistent with
the rollover being 37.5m. Such an attack is simple to
implement but of course the attacker can only reduce the
distance rather than spoof the devices to a particular dis-
tance since the measured distance will be determined by
the devices actual distance.
4.2 Theoretical Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of the
distance decreasing relay attack under various channel
conditions using simulations.
4.2.1 Simulation Setup
For the simulations, we implemented the verifier, the
prover and the attacker in Matlab. The multicarrier
phase-ranging system was modelled exactly as described
in Section 2.2. Similar to real-world phase ranging sys-
tems, the verifier uses multiple carrier frequencies in the
ISM band as the interrogating signal. The range of fre-
quencies used were 2.40−2.48GHz with a configurable
frequency hop of 1MHz or 2MHz. The phase of the ver-
ifier’s interrogating signal is selected randomly for each
frequency hop to simulate real-world behaviour. The
prover measures the phase of the verifier’s signal as in a
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Figure 13: Simulation of the on-the-fly attack where
dva and dap is the verifier-attacker distance and attacker-
prover distance respectively. Additive White Gaussian
noise is added to the verifier’s and prover’s signal. The
attacker estimates the phase of the verifier’s signal and
uses it and knowledge of the distance to the prover to es-
timate the phase of the prover’s signal when it arrives at
the attacker. The attacker then mixes and low-pass filters
the prover’s signal to achieve the desired phase shift.
real system and generates its response signal that is phase
synced to the verifier’s interrogating signal. For evalu-
ating the effectiveness of the attack under noisy channel
conditions, white Gaussian noise is added to both the ver-
ifier’s and the prover’s signal. The distances between the
verifier, prover and the attacker were simulated by intro-
ducing propagation delays in the signal. For example,
in order to simulate a verifier-prover distance of 30m,
the signals were temporally shifted by 100ns before they
were processed by the verifier or the prover.
The attacker was modelled depending on the type
of attack evaluated. In the scenario of the phase-slope
rollover and the RF cycle slip attack (Figure 12), the
attacker only received and delayed the response signal
from the prover appropriately before relaying it to the
verifier. In the case of on-the-fly phase manipulation
attack (Figure 13), the attacker estimates the phase of
the verifier’s signal to be able to estimate the phase of
the prover’s signal when it reaches the attacker. The
attacker then mixes the received response signal with
his locally generated signal as described in Section 3.4
to generate a attack signal that is appropriately shifted
in phase in order to reduce the distance estimate while
preserving the carrier frequency. The attack signal is
low-pass filtered and relayed to the verifier.
4.2.2 Effect of Channel Noise
We evaluated the effectiveness of the various distance
decreasing attacks described in Section 3 under different
noise conditions. The evaluations were averaged over
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
SNR [dB]
0
10
20
30
40
D
ist
an
ce
 E
rro
r [
m]
Non-spoofed 1 MHz
Spoofed 1 MHz
Non-spoofed 2 MHz
Spoofed 2 MHz
Figure 14: The error in the measured distance in a non-
adversarial and when a RF cycle slip attack is performed.
The non-adversarial measurements are when prover is lo-
cated 1 m away from the verifier. In the adversarial set-
ting the prover is located 30 m away from the verifier
and the attacker tries to reduce this distance to 1 m. In
the adversarial setting the prover and verifier are not in
communications range
100 different iterations for each SNR value in the set
[0− 30]dB. We compared the error in the estimated
distance in an adversarial and non-adversarial scenario.
The non-adversarial setting was simulated with the
prover located 1m away from the verifier without any
attacker present. In the adversarial scenario, an attacker
located 1m away from the verifier relayed the signals
between the verifier and the prover. The verifier and the
prover were assumed to be out of communication range.
Additive white Gaussian noise was added to both the
verifier’s interrogating signal and the prover’s response
signal. Figure 14 and Figure 15 shows the results for the
RF cycle slip attacker and On-the-fly phase manipulation
attacker respectively. We simulated the attacks for the
commonly used frequency hop size of 1MHz and
2MHz. As seen in Figure 14 for the RF cycle slip attack,
there is little difference in the distance error between the
adversarial and non-adversarial setting. However, the
on-the-fly phase manipulation attacker performs slightly
worse than the non-adversarial setting. This is because
the attacker must estimate the verifier’s phase under
noisy conditions and any error in this estimation results
in an incorrect phase shift.
4.2.3 Effect of Interference from the Prover
In certain scenarios, it is common that the verifier and
the prover are in communication range and the verifier
also receives the legitimate response signals in addition
to the attacker’s signals. In this set of experiments,
we evaluated the effect of interference caused by the
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(a) The received phase at the verifier if an attacker changes the
phase of each carrier randomly.
(b) The verifier attempt to straighten the phase and linearly fit it.
Figure 17: The distance estimated based on a random phase will be approximately dmax2 where dmax is the maximum
measurable distance.
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Figure 15: The error in the measured distance in a non-
adversarial and when a OTF attack is performed. The
non-adversarial measurements are when prover is lo-
cated 1 m away from the verifier. In the adversarial set-
ting the prover is located 74 m away from the verifier
and the attacker tries to reduce this distance to 1 m. In
the adversarial setting the prover and verifier are not in
communications range
legitimate prover signals on the ability of the attacker to
reduce the estimated distance. The amplitude and phase
of the received signal at the verifier will depend on both
the amplitude and phase of the attacker and the prover
signals. For example, if the prover’s signal is weaker
than the attacker’s, the effect on the estimated distance
due to the legitimate prover’s signal will be minimal.
Figure 16 shows the deviation in the distance calculated
by the verifier for different verifier-prover distances. In
our simulations, the attacker was located 1m away from
the verifier and the prover’s distance from the verifier
was varied. The attacker’s objective was always to force
the estimated distance to be 1m. It can be seen that
the effect is negligible even if the prover is located at a
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Figure 16: The effect on measured distance when the
verifier and prover are in communications range and the
attacker does not correct for the effect from the prover’s
signal. The attacker is located 1 m away from the verifier
and tries to decrease the distance to 1 m for all prover-
verifier distances.
distance of 10m from the verifier.
4.2.4 Random Phase Manipulation Attack
An attacker can simply introduce a random phase change
to the prover’s signal, by either randomly delaying the
phase of individual carrier frequencies or introducing a
random phase change in the on-the-fly attack. Figure 17
shows the received phase at the verifier if such an attack
is performed. A naive phase-ranging system might
simply try to linearly fit a slope to the measured phase
which will result in an incorrect distance. Depending
on the true distance of the prover and verifier, the
attacker might thus achieve a distance reduction by
simply randomly manipulating the phase. However, a
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verifier should be able to detect that the received phase is
abnormal and thus surmise that any distance calculated
from it would be incorrect.
5 Effectiveness of Possible Countermea-
sures
In this section, we discuss possible countermeasures and
their effectiveness in preventing the distance decrease
attacks described previously.
5.1 Frequency Hopping
In order to execute the distance decreasing attack, the
attacker must know the correct carrier frequency or be
capable of re-transmitting the entire set of frequencies
used for ranging. So, an obvious countermeasure would
be to implement pseudo-random frequency hopping. In
other words, the verifier and the prover change carrier
frequencies based on a shared secret during the ranging
process. However, it would be ineffective against
attackers capable of listening and transmitting over the
entire range of frequencies used by the system. With
the widespread availability of low-cost, high-bandwidth
amplifiers [11], it is reasonable to assume that the at-
tacker would be capable of executing these attacks over
the entire range of frequencies used by the multicarrier
phase ranging system. Moreover, the attacker can listen
to the verifier’s interrogating signal that is necessary
for the prover to lock and retransmit its response,
thereby easily detecting the next frequency used by the
verifier and prover to execute the ranging. Thus, a large
bandwidth or a pseudo-random frequency hop sequence
would be ineffective in preventing distance decreasing
attacks.
5.2 Rough Time-of-Flight Estimation
An alternative countermeasure would be to realize a
rough time-of-flight estimation. The verifier and the
prover can implement a challenge-response mechanism
i.e., the verifier modulates challenges in the interrogat-
ing signal that is transmitted to the prover. The prover
demodulates the challenge, computes a corresponding
response and modulates them back on the phase-locked
response signal that the prover transmits back to the ver-
ifier. Assuming that the signals travel at the speed of
light and knowing the prover’s processing time, the veri-
fier can estimate a coarse distance by measuring the time
elapsed between transmitting the challenges and receiv-
ing the responses. It is well established that the preci-
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Figure 18: The prover adds a phase offset to the received
phase, which is known to the verifier.
sion of the time estimate depends on the system band-
width [8]. Commercially available phase-ranging radio
transceivers today are capable of exchanging data at a
maximum rate of 2Mbps. Assuming that the transceivers
can estimate time-of-flight at this data rate, the maximum
achievable precision is 500ns, which translates to a dis-
tance estimate of 150m. This means that, the system
would potentially detect attacks in scenarios where the
prover is greater than 150m away from the verifier.
It is important to note that the time-of-flight estimate
would only guarantee whether the prover is within, for
example 150m. This still leaves a lot of room for an
attacker to execute a distance decreasing attack as phase-
ranging would still be required in addition to rough time-
of-flight for precise distance estimates. For example, the
attacker can still reduce the estimated distance to 1m
even in scenarios where the prover is located 100m away
from the verifier. In order to improve the precision of the
time-of-flight estimate, it is necessary to increase the sys-
tem bandwidth. Given that one of the main advantages
of multicarrier phase ranging is its low-complexity and
cost, increasing the bandwidth for better time-of-flight
estimate will potentially make the phase-ranging system
redundant.
5.3 Phase-shifted Response Signal
Even though implementing a time-of-flight estimation
prevents rollover attacks, it is ineffective against an at-
tacker capable of on-the-fly phase manipulation. As de-
scribed previously, in an on-the-fly phase manipulation
attack, the attacker does not reduce the estimated dis-
tance by delaying the signals. The attacker mixes a lo-
cally generated intermediate frequency signal with the
response signal in real-time to generate the attack signal.
In order to generate the intermediate frequency signal,
the attacker must know the phase of the incoming re-
sponse signal. The attacker can estimate the phase of the
11
incoming response signal based on the prover’s distance.
The prover can potentially leverage this requirement for
the attacker and introduce additional phase-shifts in its
response signals. The phase-shifts introduced by the
prover can be agreed apriori with the verifier and can
be accounted for during the distance estimation. The at-
tacker cannot guess the phase-shift that the prover intro-
duces and thereby cannot generate a corresponding mix-
ing signal to execute the distance reduction attack and
thereby will result in large fluctuations in the measured
phase difference across the carrier frequencies. Recall
that, in an non-adversarial setting, the phase difference
between the carrier frequencies would vary linearly.
However, an attacker can always detect the phase
of the response signal and accordingly generate the
mixing signal. Due to the required precision of the
phase estimates, the verifier and the prover transmit
their interrogating and response signals for a long
duration of time 60 − 100µs, in order to allow the
phase-locked loop to converge to a precise value. This
gives significant time for the attacker to detect the phase
of the response signal and generate the necessary mixing
signal for the distance decreasing attack. Furthermore, it
is important to note that, this technique does not prevent
the rollover attacks and hence has to be combined with
rough time-of-flight estimation technique. This further
increases the complexity of the system, thereby making
other ranging techniques such as UWB-IR better suited
for security critical applications.
6 Related Work
In this section, we discuss relevant related work in
physical-layer security of wireless ranging systems be-
ginning with the works closest to ours. Physical-layer
attacks exploits the physical properties of the radio com-
munication system and are therefore independent of any
higher layer cryptographic protocols implemented. Sev-
eral attacks ranging from simply relaying the signal be-
tween two legitimate nodes to injecting messages at the
physical layer were demonstrated in the past. Clulow et
al. [10] introduced physical-layer attacks such as early
detect and late commit attacks. In an early detect at-
tack, the attacker predicts the data bit before receiving
the entire symbol while in a late commit attack, the at-
tacker leverages the ability of the receiver to decode the
bit even though the entire symbol has not been correctly
received. The feasibility of these attacks on a ISO 14443
RFID was demonstrated in [19].
For short and medium-distance precision ranging
and localisation, ultra-wide band (UWB) and chirp
spread spectrum (CSS) emerged as the most promi-
nent techniques [36] and were standardized in IEEE
802.15.4a [22] and ISO/IEC 24730-5 [3]. Flury et
al. [14] evaluated the security of impulse radio ultra
wide-band PHY layer. The authors demonstrated an ef-
fective distance decrease of 140 m for the mandatory
modes of the standard. Poturalski et al. [27, 28] intro-
duced the Cicada attack on the impulse radio ultra wide-
band PHY. In this attack, a malicious transmitter contin-
uously transmits a “1” impulse with power greater than
that of an honest transmitter. This degrades the perfor-
mance of energy detection based receivers resulting in
distance reduction and possibly denial of service. Ran-
ganathan et al. [30] investigated the security of CSS-
based ranging systems and demonstrated that an attacker
would be able to effectively reduce the distance esti-
mated by more than 600 m.
To the best of our knowledge, the security of
phase ranging systems have not been evaluated
in literature. However, there have been several
works [13, 24, 32, 37, 46] that evaluated novel high
precision distance measurement techniques using carrier
phase of a signal.
7 Conclusion
In this work, we investigated the security of multicar-
rier phase-based ranging systems and demonstrated its
vulnerability to distance decreasing relay attacks. We
demonstrated both through simulations and real world
experiments that phase-based ranging is vulnerable to a
variety of distance reduction attacks. We showed that an
attacker can reduce the distance measured by a multicar-
rier phase-based ranging system to any arbitrary value
and thus compromise its security. Specifically, we suc-
cessfully reduced the estimated range to less than 3m
even though the devices were more than 50 m apart.
We discussed possible countermeasures that can make it
more costly and difficult for an attacker. However, these
countermeasures increase the system complexity, do not
fully secure against distance decreasing attacks and can
be easily circumvented by strong attackers.
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